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FULL TRANSPARENCY: A CASE AGAINST THE 
COLLECTION OF INTERNET INFORMATION IN  
TRUMP-ERA AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
Thomas P. Campbell* 
ABSTRACT 
The Department of Homeland Security recently posted a Notice in the 
Federal Register informing of an update to the immigrant tracking database 
known as the “Alien Files.” The Notice stated that the A-Files database will 
now store: “social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, 
and [internet] search results.” On October 28, 2017, the policy change 
outlined in the Notice went into effect. This Comment critically analyzes the 
new DHS policy, while considering the various legal, social, and practical 
concerns associated with this policy. This is a case against the DHS’s 
collection and storage of immigrant social media information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
posted a notice in the Federal Register (the “Notice”) explaining a change in 
the Alien Files (“A-Files”) system.1 The Notice states that, effective October 
18, 2017, a new A-Files system will collect, monitor, and store the social 
media activity of individuals who are subject to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”).2 This policy would cover lawful permanent 
residents (“LPRs”), Naturalized United States Citizens, individuals 
petitioning for INA benefits, legal guardians of the disabled, and any other 
persons subject to the vast provisions of the INA.3 The DHS intends to store 
“social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and 
search results” in its updated A-Files system.4  
On October 18, 2017, the customary 30-day comment period officially 
ended, and the policy specified in the Notice went into effect.5 During the 
comment period, 2,994 public comments were submitted.6 The vast majority 
of these comments were submitted by individuals offering scathing critiques 
of the new DHS policy.7 These comments varied in tone, some offered by 
esteemed law professors, others offered by worried (and often enraged) 
private citizens.8 Some of the more compelling comments will be highlighted 
here.  
Criticisms were not limited to this axiomatic “comment section.” United 
States Representative Ted Lieu spoke out against the new policy and 
 
1 See Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (proposed Sept. 18, 2017) 
[hereinafter DHS Notice]. 
2 Id. at 43,556–57. 
3 Id. at 43,559. 
4 Id. at 43,557, 43,560. 
5 Id. at 43,556. 
6 See DHS/USCIS-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=D
HS-2017-0038 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
7 See id. 
8 Compare Comment Submitted by Catherine Martinez, Members of the Yale Law School 
Community, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-2017-
0038-2986 [hereinafter Comment by Catherine Martinez], with Megan Hughes, Comment Submitted by 
Megan Hughes, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-
2017-0038-2994. 
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addressed a letter to then-acting United States Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Elaine Duke.9 Representative Lieu began by explaining that he is a 
naturalized citizen who has lived in the United States for over four decades.10 
Representative Lieu worriedly stated that he was “deeply concerned” that the 
proposed rule would apply to United States citizens such as himself.11 He 
even demanded that the DHS provide further details and clarifications, as 
related to some of the more ambiguous provisions in the Notice.12 To date, 
these clarifications have not been provided.  
Critics and skeptics do have a legitimate reason to be worried. At the 
moment, the United States is one of the largest consumers of social media in 
the world.13 Social media usage in the United States is at an all-time high.14 
According to Statista, 81% of the United States population currently utilizes 
social media.15 Unsurprisingly, this number is even higher among young 
Americans.16 Statista estimates that 86% of young adults (ages 18–29) utilize 
social media.17 Because social media is so heavily relied upon in the United 
States, the new DHS policy can impact a myriad citizens and noncitizens 
alike.  
In wake of the recent outcry, a spokesperson at the DHS has explained 
to multiple news outlets that the Notice is not new policy.18 Joanne Talbot, 
the DHS spokesperson, explained that the Notice is actually “an effort [by 
the DHS] to be more transparent.”19 In an email to ARStechnica.com, Talbot 
further explained that the Notice is only an amendment to a 2012 DHS policy 
 
9 Cyrus Farivar, Congressman Demands to Know if DHS Will Collect His Social Media History, 
Too, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/09/congressman-demands-to-know-if-dhs-will-collect-his-social-media-history-too/; Ted. 
W. Lieu, Letter to the Honorable Elaine Duke 1, 1 (2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4063724/Letter-to-DHS-Social-Media.pdf.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Social Media Usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/topics/3196/social-media-usage-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 17, 
2018). 
14 See id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Fariviar, supra note 9; Joel Rose, Federal Plan To Keep Files Of Immigrant Social Media 
Activity Causes Alarm, NPR (Sept. 30, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/30/554557044/federal-plan-to-keep-files-of-immigrant-social-media-
activity-causes-alarm. 
19 Rose, supra note 18. 
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titled Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media.20 Talbot also 
explained that “[t]he Federal Register Notice states that previously captured 
information from any social media checks that took place up to naturalization 
will remain in the naturalized citizens [sic] Alien File, otherwise known as 
the A File. By law, USCIS will not continue to check the social media 
accounts of naturalized citizens.”21 This clarification may reflect alleged 
internal protocol, but it seemingly contradicts the explicit language within 
the Notice.  
As the DHS spokesperson’s comments emphasized, the language in the 
Notice is extremely important to the overall comprehension of the new 
policy. Unfortunately, the language in the Notice is convoluted and difficult 
to follow.22 The most concise summary of the new policy to be implemented 
can be found in the Notice section titled “I. Background.”23 This section 
neatly explains that the “DHS is updating the DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001 
Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records to include 
the following substantive changes.”24 The Notice then lists 12 changes.25 
Provision (5) of the list explains that the DHS will now “expand the 
categories of records to include country of nationality; country of residence; 
the USCIS Online Account Number; social media handles, aliases, associated 
identifiable information, and search results.”26 It is this new policy that has 
sparked the public outcry.  
The DHS should promptly halt the collection of immigrant social media 
information. This Comment addresses the new DHS policy as follows. Part 
II below sets the stage, introducing the background information necessary to 
comprehend the issue. Part III begins the analysis, delving deeper into the 
many issues associated with the new DHS policy. Part IV concludes, settling 
the case against the Federal collection of immigrant social media 
information. 
 
20 Farviar, supra note 9; see generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY POLICY FOR 
OPERATIONAL USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 1 (2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Directive_110-
01_Privacy_Policy_for_Operational_Use_of_Social_Media_0.pdf. 
21 Farviar, supra note 9. 
22 See DHS Notice, supra note 1. 
23 Id. at 43,557. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 44,357–58.  
26 Id. at 43,557. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Social Media Use and Privacy 
As the internet grows, communication on the web has become extremely 
common. Essentially all of our communication takes place via the internet. 
Unsurprisingly, social media has become the bedrock of American culture.27 
In 2016, researchers determined that nearly 80% of online Americans use 
Facebook, with another 24% utilizing Twitter.28 With so many social media 
users, exactly how private are these modern modes of communication? 
United States courts have found that information posted to social media 
is not as private as a user may assume.29 In People v. Harris, the New York 
Criminal Court recently explained that Twitter posts are not considered 
private information.30 The court reiterated that any information released to a 
third-party should not be construed as private communication.31 The court 
reasoned:  
If you post a tweet, just like if you scream it out the window, 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. There is no 
proprietary interest in your tweets, which you have now 
gifted to the world. This is not the same as a private email, a 
private direct message, a private chat, or any of the other 
readily available ways to have a private conversation via the 
Internet that now exist.32 
The court also explained that any posts or revelations to a third-party social 
media provider, such as “Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, or the next 
hot social media application,” would not be considered private.33 This 
jurisprudential concept is known as the third-party doctrine. 
This third-party doctrine was originally set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, back in 1979.34 In this seminal case, an 
accused burglar was making threatening telephone calls to the victim of his 
 
27 See generally SHANNON GREENWOOD, ANDREW PERRIN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2016: FACEBOOK USAGE AND ENGAGEMENT IS ON THE RISE, WHILE 
ADOPTION OF OTHER PLATFORMS HOLDS STEADY 1 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2016/11/10132827/PI_2016.11.11_Social-Media-Update_FINAL.pdf. 
28 Id. at 3.  
29 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Misc. 3d 868, 949 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
30 Id. at 872. 
31 Id. at 872–73. 
32 Id. at 874. 
33 Id. at 873. 
34 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
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prior crime.35 At police request, the telephone company installed what was 
known as a “pen register” to track and record all dialed phone numbers 
coming from the suspect’s home phone.36 The police did not obtain a warrant 
for the pen register.37 The suspect argued that the police had violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.38 
The question—whether the installation of the pen register constituted an 
illegal search—hinged upon whether the suspect had a “‘legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.”39  
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that there was no “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” attached to dialed telephone numbers.40 The Court 
explained that when people dial telephone numbers, the telephone company 
is receiving and potentially making permanent record of these numbers.41 
“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”42 The 
Court further explained that the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical 
information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its 
equipment . . . [i]n so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company 
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”43 Thus, the third-party 
doctrine was born. The ever important Fourth Amendment protection—the 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure—officially wilted.  
The Supreme Court has never officially applied the third-party doctrine 
to internet-based communication.44 Still, legal experts have developed 
various theories pertaining to the application of the third-party doctrine to 
online communication. One such application is known as “waiver theory.”45 
Waiver theory explains that “a [social media] user consents to revealing . . . 
information to the ISP and thus seemingly forfeits any protection over the 
transmission. The user made a voluntary choice to sign an agreement before 
opening an account, acknowledging that Facebook will hold the user’s 
communications.”46 It thus follows that no Fourth Amendment protection 
 
35 Id. at 737. 
36 Id. at 737–38. 
37 Id. at 737. 
38 Id. at 738–39. 
39 Id. at 742. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 743–44. 
43 Id. at 744. 
44 Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not 
Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
45 Id. at 15–17.  
46 Id. at 16–17. 
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would be afforded, because internet-based communications are not afforded 
an objective expectation of privacy.47  
Ultimately, the third-party doctrine leaves a vast amount of information 
exposed and unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. For example, 
information associated with credit card transactions, phone records, and cell 
phone locations would probably not be protected.48 The United States 
government has been given significant leeway to collect and store 
information transmitted via the internet. Both citizens and noncitizens alike 
could be subject to significant data collection due to internet use, without any 
legitimate constitutional redress. Almost 40 years ago, long before the 
existence of the internet and social media, the Supreme Court made a decision 
that time has proven unreasonable. Now that internet is so indispensable to 
every aspect of modern life, governmental oversight bodies can easily justify 
the collection of social media data as being in tune with the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in Smith v. Maryland.49 
B. The Language in the Notice  
As previously mentioned, the Notice is lengthy, confusing, and riddled 
with bullet points. It is important, however, to examine the Notice language 
thoroughly. If the information contained in the Notice is truly an “effort [by 
the DHS] to be [more] transparent,”50 this language is of the utmost 
importance.  
The Notice begins by stating that the outdated, partially paper-based A-
Files system is set to be clarified and updated.51 The Notice introduces these 
changes in the “Supplementary Information” section.52 This section states 
that each immigrant alien has an A-File, which corresponds with their Alien 
Number.53 The Notice then explains that the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the custodian of the A-Files system.54 
This filing system is jointly contributed to by the USCIS, United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and United States Customs 
and Border Protection (“CBP”).55  
 
47 Id.  
48 See Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 691–
92 (2014). 
49 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
50 Rose, supra note 18.  
51 DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557. 
52 See id. at 43,556. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 43,557. 
55 Id. 
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The next section, titled “I. Background,” reiterates and further expounds 
upon the policy that is to change.56 As previously mentioned, this section sets 
a list of substantive changes to the current A-Files system, including the 
“expan[sion] [of] categories of records to include . . . social media handles, 
aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results.”57 This 
section also clarifies the legality of the proposed data collection scheme.58 It 
explains that because the A-Files system is a “system of records,” it is 
governed by the Privacy Act of 1974.59 A system of records is defined as 
“any records under the control of an agency from which information is 
retrieved by the name of an individual or by some identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”60 The 
Privacy Act defines the term “individual” as someone “encompass[ing] U.S. 
citizen[ship] and lawful permanent residents.”61  
In a later section titled “Purpose(s) of the System,” the DHS explains 
and attempts to justify its newly proposed policy.62 The purpose of this new 
program is to create an official record of an “individual’s immigration 
applications, petitions, and requests, as well as enforcement transactions as 
he or she passes through the U.S. immigration process.”63 Earlier in the 
Notice, the DHS explained that the USCIS, in conjunction with the DHS, is 
responsible for processing “applications and petitions submitted for 
citizenship, asylum, and other benefits.”64 Thus, according to the Notice, this 
new A-Files system is meant to streamline the process and prevent fraudulent 
applications from being granted.65 
Another important section in the Notice is aptly titled “Categories of 
Individuals Covered by the System.”66 Individuals covered by the system 
include LPRs, naturalized United States citizens, individuals petitioning for 
benefits on behalf of another, individuals acting as a guardian on behalf of a 
disabled individual, individuals who receive benefits, and individuals who 
are subject to enforcement provisions.67 The system also covers: anyone who 
is subject to the INA and is under investigation for national security purposes; 
 
56 Id. at 43,557–59. 
57 Id. at 43,557. 
58 See id.  
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 43,559. 
61 Id. at 43,559. 
62 See id. at 43,558. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 43,557. 
65 Id. at 43,557–59. 
66 Id. at 43,558. 
67 Id. 
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anyone who was investigated in the past; anyone who is suspected of having 
violated any non-INA immigration provision; and anyone with information 
related to certain INA violations.68 Essentially, anyone who has come in 
contact with the United States immigration system is subject to the new 
policy.69  
Despite the overwhelming amount of information in the Notice, it also 
contains some shockingly underdeveloped provisions. Specifically, it 
contains no limiting language or oversight provisions. Astonishingly, the 
Notice states that the information collected in the A-Files system “may be 
shared with [the] appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign, 
or international government agencies.”70 With so much leeway being 
afforded to the DHS, the lack of restraint associated with this new 
governmental policy is extremely evident and troublesome.  
C. Legal Authorities Protecting Citizen Data from Government 
Intrusion  
It is clear that the United States government has granted itself a lot of 
freedom to monitor. Still, there are some privacy protections in place 
designed to protect against government overreach. Unfortunately, these 
protections are mostly inadequate, and do not stop the United States 
government from monitoring immigrants. Relevant United States domestic 
legislation and international privacy protections are examined below.  
1. Amendment IV to the United States Constitution 
In the United States, one of the most sacred and revered protections 
against unwarranted governmental intrusion is embedded in the 
Constitution.71 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads as follows:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.72 
 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 43,558. 
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Fourth Amendment features very specific language written centuries 
ago—long before the existence of Facebook or Twitter. The question thus 
becomes, will this language protect the social media information of 
immigrants in today’s modern society?  
Courts have wrestled with this question and reached puzzling 
conclusions. In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit 
examined the Fourth Amendment’s usage of the words “the people,” in an 
attempt to determine if noncitizens are afforded Fourth Amendment 
protections.73 The court applied the Verdugo-Urquidez Supreme Court 
rationale and concluded that, for Fourth Amendment protections to apply, an 
alien must show “‘substantial connections’ with [the United States].”74 
Further, the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe simply stated that, “an alien is 
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”75 When surveillance 
occurs within the United States, the assumption is that the associated 
“person” is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, whereas outside the 
United States the reverse is the case.76 Even immigrant aliens within the 
United States would seemingly be granted Fourth Amendment protections as 
“persons.”77 
However, as explained above, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland 
set forth the third-party doctrine, essentially whittling away Fourth 
Amendment protections as applied to data collected via a third-party.78 The 
Court explained that despite some subjective expectations,third-party 
facilitated communications are private, andthere isno objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy.79 Until the Supreme Court is presented with a chance 
to rescind the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment will not protect 
internet-based communications.80 
2. The Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act of 2002 
In a subsequent email sent to ARStechnica.com, DHS spokesperson 
Joanne Talbot attached a declassified presentation titled “DHS Social Media 
 
73 See 798 F.3d 664, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2015). 
74 Id. at 670 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
75 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).  
76 See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to 
Privacy and National Security Surveillance (2018), GWU LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 2017-67 (forthcoming Sept. 2017). 
77 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. 
78 See 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
79 See id. at 740. 
80 See id. at 743–44. 
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Update.”81 Talbot explained that “[t]he attached presentation will help you 
understand how [the] DHS uses its already-in place social media policy.”82 
The presentation, dated December 5, 2016, was released internally by the 
DHS privacy office.83 On the slide titled “Legal Authorities,” one bullet states 
that there are “[n]o explicitly worded authorities regarding social media.”84 
However, the last bullet on this slide states that “[s]tatutes such as the E-
Government Act of 2002 and the Privacy Act of 1974 create privacy 
protection for individuals whose information is being used and stored by the 
government.”85 
The Notice also refers directly to the Privacy Act of 1974.86 This Act 
was passed after the Watergate scandal, at a time when Congress was 
concerned about illegal surveillance and computer-stored information.87 The 
Privacy Act controls the collection of data stored in a “system of records” by 
the government.88 The Act has four main policy objectives: 
1. To restrict disclosure of personally identifiable records 
maintained by agencies.  
 
2. To grant individuals increased rights of access to agency 
records maintained on them.  
 
3. To grant individuals the right to seek amendment of 
agency records maintained on themselves upon a showing 
that the records are not accurate, relevant, timely, or 
complete.  
 
4. To establish a code of ‘fair information practices’ which 
require agencies to comply with statutory norms for 
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of records.89  
 
81 Fariviar, supra note 9. 
82 Id. 
83 See id.  
84 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 1, 4 (2016), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4065386/DPIAC-Social-Media.pdf. 
85 Id.  
86 See DHS Notice, supra note 1.  
87 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, 
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1279 (last updated Aug. 16, 2013).  
88 About the Privacy Act, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/about-
privacy-act (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).  
89 Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 87.  
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The Privacy Act also requires that the public be informed via a System of 
Records Notice (“SORN”) published in the Federal Register.90  
Following the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress passed the E-Government 
Act of 2002, attempting to cope with the rapidly changing dynamics of the 
internet.91 This Act mandates that all federal agencies must create Privacy 
Impact Assessments (“PIAs”) when implementing new “technology that 
collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable information . . . , 
or for a new aggregation of information that is collected, maintained, or 
disseminated using information technology.”92 Assumedly, the Notice 
complies with this E-Government Act.  
3. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
In 1986, the United States government passed the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).93 The passage of this Act was 
another attempt by Congress to prevent “unauthorized government 
surveillance of electronic communications.”94 This Act only shielded the 
popular electronic communication of that era.95 More specifically, the Act 
made it illegal for the government to wiretap, interfere with stored electronic 
communications, and required a warrant for the deployment of a pen 
register.96  
Because the ECPA is full of outdated language, it is difficult to extend 
its protections to modern internet-based communications. Still, the ECPA 
states that the government must obtain a search warrant (supported by 
probable cause) to access any stored communications less than 180 days 
old.97 However, due to the obsolescence of the ECPA, protections seemingly 
extend only to stored, unread emails.98 As Professor Mondu Bedi 
 
90 Id. Note that the DHS Notice is a SORN, which is why the Notice was posted in the Federal 
Register.  
91 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002); see also E-Government Act 
of 2002, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1287 (last 
updated Sept. 19, 2013). 
92 Id. 
93 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2018); see also Bedi, 
supra note 44, at 31. 
94 Bedi, supra note 44, at 31–32. 
95 Id. at 32. 
96 Id. 
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018). 
98 Bedi, supra note 44, at 33–34. 
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summarizes, “most . . . [social media] communications will not receive 
SCA99 protection.”100 
4. International Privacy Safeguards 
Aside from these various, mostly faltering domestic privacy protections, 
some international protections exist. Unfortunately, these protections are 
more conceptual than practical. Since its inception, the United Nations has 
attempted to protect the human right to privacy.101 In 1948, the UN General 
Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”).102 The right to privacy thus became recognized as a universal and 
fundamental right.103 Article 12 of the UDHR states: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”104  
Because the UDHR was a resolution and not a binding instrument, the 
UN took steps to memorialize the declaration.105 This lead to the passage of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).106 The 
ICCPR is an “early” United Nations treaty, guaranteeing several civil and 
political rights.107 The ICCPR was adopted in 1966.108 26 years later in 1992, 
the United States formally ratified the convention.109 However, despite the 
ratification, the United States attached numerous reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”).110 Article 17, which is most 
relevant to the discussion here, was not reserved against by the United 
States.111 
 
99 The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (2018). Note that Stored 
Communications Act is a provision (Title II) of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 
100 Bedi, supra note 44, at 33. 
101 Lauren H. Rakower, Note, Blurred Line: Zooming in on Google Street View and the Global 
Right to Privacy, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 317, 320 (2011). 
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
103 See id.  
104 Id. at art. 12. 
105 Rakower, supra note 101, at 321. 
106 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 3. 
107 Kristina Ash, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, ¶ 3 (2005). 
108 Id. at n.7. 
109 Id. at ¶ 3.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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In 2015, Human Rights Council Resolution 28/16 “directly or indirectly 
confirmed that Article 17 of the ICCPR is implicated by the gathering and 
processing of personal data.”112 Article 17 of the ICCPR explicitly states that 
“(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. (2) Everyone has the right to protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”113 Article 2(1) recognizes the relevant 
scope of the Covenant, stating: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.114  
It thus follows that communication taking place within a nation’s borders, or 
communication involving a state citizen, would satisfy this scope 
requirement, triggering Article 17.115 
ICCPR Article 2 also relates to potential extraterritorial 
communications, but not according to the United States.116 The United States 
takes an extremely narrow view regarding the scope of the ICCPR.117 It is the 
United States’ position that the Covenant does not reach extraterritorial-
based communications.118 “According to the United States, the ICCPR’s 
safeguards apply only to persons who are both within the state’s territory and 
subject to the state’s jurisdiction.”119 This narrow interpretation allows and 
justifies various United States surveillance programs of foreign 
individuals.120  
 
112 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 3. 
113 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
114 Id. at art. 2, para. 1.  
115 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 4. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Mass Collection of Data Does Not Adequately Detect Crime 
The DHS cites to several justifications for the new DHS policy.121 Its 
most touted justification is that this new policy will support increased 
national security—likely a result of a recent terroristic trigger.122 According 
to Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration expert at the Cato Institute Center for 
Global Liberty and Prosperity, the recent focus on immigrant social media 
information may stem from one of the San Bernardino shooter’s later-
discovered social media pages.123 Nowrasteh explained that this policy shift 
“is another example of the government changing security protocols based on 
a previous incident that will impose an enormous cost and that is of dubious 
value for the future.”124 Still, research has shown that social media collection 
does not adequately deter crime.125 
The idea of incorporating online social media into immigration analysis 
is not new.126 The DHS has revealed recent policy from 2012, which permits 
the collection of immigrant social media information.127 According to 
documents obtained by thedailybeast.com, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a component of the DHS, began projects 
to analyze the “publicly available social media of small groups of would-be 
immigrants.”128 Documents further reveal that in 2016, USCIS created an 
entire Social Media Branch dedicated to monitoring social media data 
belonging to immigrants from “high risk populations.”129 In 2017, the Trump 
administration approved a policy requiring social media username and profile 
information for anyone applying for a United States visa.130 
 
121 See DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,559.  
122 See id.  
123 Adolfo Flores, People Are Worried About DHS Plans to Gather Social Media Info, BUZZFEED 
 (Sept. 25, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/adolfoflores/people-are-worried-about-dhs-plans-
to-gather-social-media?utm_term=.qrQ93bM1A#.rmwOxJK3R. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Aliya Sternstein, Obama Team Did Some ‘Extreme Vetting’ of Muslims Before Trump, New 
Documents Show, DAILYBEAST (Jan. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/obama-team-
did-some-extreme-vetting-of-muslims-before-trump-new-documents-show?ref=home. 
127 Id.; see also Fariviar, supra note 9; Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media, supra 
note 9.  
128 Sternstein, supra note 126. 
129 Id. 
130 Melissa Quinn, State Department Starts Vetting Visa Applicants’ Social Media Profiles: 
Report, WASH. EXAMINER (June 6, 2017, 8:16 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/state-
department-starts-vetting-visa-applicants-social-media-profiles-report/article/2625047. 
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The evolution of immigrant social media vetting has reached its zenith. 
However, the data does not show that data collection has effectively 
prevented any national security threats or denied admissions to any 
dangerous peoples.131 According to a report released by the Office of the 
Inspector General, the DHS’s social media monitoring programs do not 
contain the requisite criteria for determining effectiveness.132 The report is 
appropriately titled, “DHS’ Pilots for Social Media Screening Need 
Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success,” and 
recommends that the DHS implement a plan to include measurable quality 
standards in their collection programs.133 The DHS concurred with the 
findings, and set forth a four-prong approach to meet the report’s 
recommendations.134 Thereafter, the DHS dismissed the issue, claiming that 
the problem was rectified.135  
Additionally, social media collection programs have not been shown to 
prevent any dangerous immigrants from entering the United States.136 
Immigration analyst Alex Nowrasteh argues that “[s]ocial media has been 
used by immigration courts for years but there is very little evidence that it’s 
helped with visa vetting.”137 Shockingly, his claims are substantiated by 
internal White House documents.138 These briefing documents, provided to 
then president-elect Donald Trump and his transition team, stated that the 
collection and analysis of refugee social media did not yield any successful 
results.139 Excerpts of the White House documents explain that the first three 
“Refugee Pilots” were able to link applicants to their respective social media 
accounts.140 However, the information gleamed from these accounts “did not 
produce clear links to national security concerns even for applicants who 
were found to pose a potential national security threat.”141 According to the 
 
131 See Flores, supra note 123.  
132 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DHS’ PILOTS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING NEED INCREASED 
RIGOR TO ENSURE SCALABILITY AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS (REDACTED) 1  (2017), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-40-Feb17.pdf. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Flores, supra note 123; see also Zach Whittaker, NSA is so overwhelmed with data, it’s no 
longer effective, says whistleblower, ZDNET (Apr. 27, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/nsa-
whistleblower-overwhelmed-with-data-ineffective/ (explaining that NSA mass surveillance programs are 
overwhelmed and ineffective. According to former NSA official William Binney, “[t]he US government’s 
mass surveillance programs have become so engorged with data that they are no longer effective, losing 
vital intelligence in the fray.”). 
137 Flores, supra note 123. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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information in the documents obtained by thedailybeast.com, “[a]s of 
November 2016, USCIS had not denied anyone entry or legal status ‘solely 
or primarily because of information uncovered through social media 
vetting.’”142  
The language in the Notice, as applied to these findings, should 
highlight the inadequacies of this new DHS policy. First, the federal 
government has conducted programs implementing similar policy, yielding 
no positive result.143 Because social media has become such an integral part 
of modern communication, storing “social media handles, aliases, associated 
identifiable information, and search results,”144 will not effectively pinpoint 
valuable information. Recent history has shown this. There is simply too 
much information. The language in the Notice is not precise enough to meet 
its objective.  
The Notice attempts to justify mass data collection by explaining that 
“USCIS . . . supports national security by preventing individuals from 
fraudulently obtaining immigration benefits and by denying applications 
from individuals who pose national security or public safety threats.”145 The 
United States has historically used national security as a reason to impede 
upon and minimize several human rights—especially the right to privacy.146 
The protection of human rights is extremely important. Professor William 
Burke-White argues that there seems to be an “observed correlation between 
systematic human rights violations and interstate aggression.”147 Thus, using 
security-centric language to justify the degradation of American rights may 
actually be a telling factor indicating a propensity for extraterritorial 
violence.148 
It follows that the policy in question, the collection and storage of 
immigrant social media information in the DHS A-Files system, will not 
adequately prevent dangerous individuals from entering the United States 
because the past use of similar programs has been largely unsuccessful. The 
language in the Notice is also too lax and provides the DHS with 
unconstrained oversight powers. The DHS should stop the collection of 
immigrant “social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable 
information, and search results.”149 At the very least, the Notice language and 
 
142 Sternstein, supra note 126.  
143 Flores, supra note 123. 
144 DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557. 
145 Id.  
146 William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation, 17 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 249 (2004). 
147 Id. at 265. 
148 See id.  
149 DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557. 
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corresponding DHS policy would need to be made more specific, in order to 
successfully deter dangerous individuals from entering the United States. 
B. Controversial Constitutionality 
In theory, the third-party doctrine allows the DHS to collect social media 
information without a warrant and without any Fourth Amendment 
considerations.150 However, this doctrine is controversial and antiquated.151 
The DHS explained in the Notice that it is collecting and storing immigrant 
“social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and 
search results.”152 The citizenship status of the immigrants (or 
nonimmigrants) would not matter.153 The third-party doctrine totally removes 
internet-based data collection from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.154  
The third-party doctrine stemmed from the 1979 Supreme Court “pen 
register” case, Smith v. Maryland.155 The Court held that an individual could 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when information was 
transmitted via a third-party.156 This case, which was decided almost 40 years 
ago, has changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States. 
Now, no Fourth Amendment protections are afforded to any internet-based 
or electronic communication.157 Even though many internet users do believe 
that their communications are confidential or that their search results are 
hidden, the Court has ruled that this expectation is not “reasonable.”158 
Unsurprisingly, the third-party doctrine is highly controversial and often 
contemplated by legal scholars.159  
There has been some modern pushback to this third-party doctrine. 
Recently, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) requested that Apple assist the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) in accessing the 
password/encryption protected iPhone of one of the San Bernardino 
 
150 See 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
151 Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case 
for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 8 (2007). 
152 See DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557. 
153 See Bedi, supra note 44, at 3–4, 8, 47. 
154 See id. 
155 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
156 Id. at 743–44. 
157 Lawless, supra note 151, at 8. 
158 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
159 See Bedi, supra note 44, at 1; Lawless, supra note 151, at 2–5; Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 562–64 (2009).  
06 - CAMPBELL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/19 1:26 PM 
2019] Full Transparency 531 
shooters.160 Apple refused to comply.161 Ultimately, the FBI employed the 
help of an anonymous hacker to gain access to the contents of the encrypted 
iPhone.162 Even though the Fourth Amendment was not directly implicated, 
this situation brought the importance of data privacy to the limelight. As 
Apple CEO Tim Cook explained, circumventing iPhone encryption at the 
government’s request would create a dangerous precedent—even more 
dangerous than the third-party doctrine.163  
Many scholars recognize the inherent problems associated with the 
third-party doctrine. Professor Stephen E. Henderson writes that this 
controversial doctrine is “fundamentally misguided.”164 Professor Henderson 
illustrates this by exploring a modern, online book shopping experience.165 
He describes, “today if I want to purchase a book I am likely to do so online, 
where not only the bookstore, but also my Internet service provider and 
payment provider will make personal records.”166 He continues, “these 
records are stored in a digital format that permits, once an architecture has 
been established, essentially costless searching and distribution . . . [n]othing 
in the Fourth Amendment prohibits such a bookstore, or any other third party, 
from conveying information to law enforcement on its own initiative.”167 
This example illustrates the consequences and dangers of the third-party 
doctrine, as applied to a simple, noncriminal online shopping experience.  
There are clear lines drawn when it comes to data privacy and 
Constitutionality. As applied to the DHS Notice, any individual who wishes 
to visit (or immigrate to) the United States could have search histories, 
Twitter rants, YouTube binges, and Facebook profile information stored in 
their Alien File.168 This encourages anonymous online activity and password 
protected, encrypted hard drives. The Fourth Amendment has been stretched 
in favor of the United States government, under the guise of national security. 
But opposite result is likely—internet savvy individuals subject to the INA 
 
160 Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the 
Fourth Amendment, 126 YALE L.J. 216, 216 (2016). 
161 Id. at 216–17. 
162 See Kristen M. Jacobsen, Note, Game of Phones, Data Isn’t Coming: Modern Mobile 
Operating System Encryption and Its Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 566, 
569 (2017). 
163 See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 
2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/. 
164 Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 40 (2011). 
165 Id. at 45.  
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557. 
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may attempt to avoid ending up in databases that could decrease their chances 
of admission to the United States.  
Ultimately, the third-party doctrine is an outdated jurisprudential 
mishap. The only way to rectify this mishap is to bring a case to the Supreme 
Court to potentially rescind the doctrine. Only then would citizens, and 
certain noncitizens alike, have their Fourth Amendment privacy protections 
restored. At this moment, the constant collection and storage of internet-
based information by the DHS is technically constitutional. Despite this 
controversial constitutionality, negative social repercussions are likely to 
follow if the DHS continues to collect immigrant social media information.  
C. Violation of International Law 
There are also certain international privacy protections that may shield 
some information from government surveillance. Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states that, 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy.”169 The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR, and has not 
entered any RUDs against Article 17.170 The DHS’s social media collection 
policy violates this provision of the ICCPR.171 Despite this violation, 
international law does not provide a practical pathway to halt the enforcement 
of the new DHS policy.172  
Unfortunately, when an aggrieved individual seeks redress under the 
ICCPR they face limited options.173 Despite not having a judicial 
enforcement mechanism, the ICCPR “has instead an oversight and 
complaints-handling body in the form of the Human Rights Committee” 
(“UNHRC”).174 The United States has stifled this procedure by not signing 
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the document creating the Human 
Rights Committee.175 Despite the influence of the UNHRC, their decisions 
are not binding under international law.176 Still, the UNHRC has previously 
challenged the legality of mass surveillance programs, such as the (Edward 
 
169 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 113 (emphasis added).  
170 See Ash, supra note 107, at ¶ 3. 
171 See Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights 
Treaties, 6 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 247, 249–54 (1998). 
172 Id. at 249. 
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Id. 
176 Bygrave, supra note 171.  
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Snowden-uncovered) NSA surveillance program, as being incompatible with 
Article 17 of the ICCPR.177 
In 1988, the Human Rights Committee released a general comment on 
Article 17 of the ICCPR, titled “CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 
(Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation.”178 This 
comment explains the responsibilities of states to implement the privacy 
protections required by Article 17 of the ICCPR.179 For instance, in the very 
first paragraph the comment states that “[t]he [privacy] obligations imposed 
by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give 
effect to the prohibition against such [governmental] interferences and 
attacks as well as to the protection of this [privacy] right.”180 The privacy 
protection laws in the United States are inadequate, as evidenced by the 
federal DHS policy.  
Unsurprisingly, the United States views the scope of ICCPR very 
narrowly. The United States interprets ICCPR protections to extend only to 
individuals already within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.181 
This viewpoint justifies surveillance and data collection on foreign 
immigrants.182 As legal scholar Francesca Bignami argues, this narrow 
interpretation is not correct, in light of the language within the ICCPR.183 
Covenant protections cover a person when they are within the “effective 
control” of a state actor, not just within the territory of the state.184 Because 
the Notice states that individuals subject to the INA are to have their data 
collected and stored, ICCPR protections should be triggered. The ICCPR 
codifies the universal right to privacy, not just a territorial one.185  
Since there are no binding international judicial remedies, not much can 
be done. The only semi-realistic option that foreign states could select is the 
application of political pressure against the United States. The international 
community would have to explicitly condemn the actions of the United States 
and the DHS policy. First and foremost, the UN General Assembly and 
Human Rights Committee ought to condemn the DHS policy as incompatible 
 
177 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 7. 
178 U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to 
Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour 
and Reputation, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN Rev.1 (April 8, 1988).  
179 See id. 
180 Id. at para. 1. 
181 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 4. 
182 Id. at 7. 
183 Id. at 5. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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with the provisions in the ICCPR.186 However, due to the complex 
international political atmosphere, it is unlikely that any political pressure 
will be applied at this time.  
The European model of understanding the international right to privacy 
should provide the United States with better guidance to avoid implementing 
policies that may infringe upon this right. The European Convention of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) provide EU states with greater privacy safeguards and remedies, 
compared to the United States.187 Specifically, Article 8 of the ECHR titled 
the “Right to respect for private and family life,” states that: “(1) Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”188 The second provision of Article 8 explains that:  
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.189 
Despite this caveat, the ECtHR has ruled that mass surveillance programs 
must be particularized.190 The ECtHR has ruled that mass surveillance 
operations are not compatible with the right to privacy, as encapsulated in the 
ECHR.191 The United States should respect the international right to privacy, 
as a party to the ICCPR, and implement safeguards akin to the understandings 
in the ECHR.  
The DHS social media collection policy (specified in the Notice) 
violates Article 17 of ICCPR. The United States has failed to properly 
implement domestic legislation protecting the universally recognized right to 
privacy. The United States is at odds with the international consensus on this 
matter, and should promptly end the newly implemented DHS social media 
 
186 Id. at 6 (citing U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth 
Periodic Report of the United States of America 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014)).  
187 Id. at 2. 
188 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 11, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
189 Id. 
190 Bignami & Resta, supra note 76, at 18 (explaining that in the case “Szabó and Vissy v. 
Hungary, [the ECtHR’s] first NSA-style surveillance case, the Court manifested serious concerns over the 
technological advances that have enabled state authorities to collect enormous masses of personal data 
and build detailed individual profiles.” Id. The Court highlighted that for this sort of data collection to be 
appropriate, the data collection must be “strictly necessary in a democratic society.” Id. This data 
collection must also be particularized. Id.). 
191 See id. 
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collection policy. If the United States refuses to do so, there are no viable 
international judicial remedies to reconcile this violation—aside from certain 
political condemnations. 
D. Modern Issues with Social Media and Identity 
As above-mentioned, global social media use is at an all-time high. 
Theoretically, in America and abroad, nearly everyone has utilized social 
media in one form or another. In 2017, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 
exclaimed that his social media platform now hosts over two billion 
people.192 Within this vastness of social media, usership and content 
problems are issues that are not considered by the new DHS policy and 
Notice. These problems put immigrants at risk of being unfairly denied 
entrance to the United States—at no fault of their own.  
The first striking issue, that could seriously alter admissions and denials 
to the United States, is social media-based identity theft. According to 
reports, in the year 2016, social media identity fraud was up an astonishing 
57%.193 According to the fraud prevention service Cifas, “Facebook, Twitter, 
and LinkedIn . . . [have] become a ‘hunting ground’ for identity thieves.”194 
When identity thieves have obtained stolen (or even public) information from 
an individual, they have the tools to create fake social media profiles.195 The 
content on these fake profiles could then get swept up and stored in an 
immigrant’s DHS A-File system. 
Similarly, a social media profile may also be accessed by an 
unauthorized third party or “hacker.” Any information posted under the guise 
of the original account owner could be stored and archived in an A-File. 
According to The University of Phoenix researchers, “[n]early two in three 
U.S. adults who have social media profiles say they . . . [were] aware that 
their accounts . . . [had] been hacked.”196 There have been numerous recent 
 
192 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (June 27, 2017, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103831654565331. 
193 Identity Fraud Up by 57% as Thieves ‘Hunt’ on Social Media, BBC NEWS (Jul. 5, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36701297. 
194 Id. 
195 See Scott Bernstein, The Growing Epidemic of Fake LinkedIn Profiles, LINKEDIN (Oct. 8, 
2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/growing-epidemic-fake-linkedin-profiles-scott-bernstein; see 
also Social Media Protection Brand Fraud Report, PROOFPOINT, 
https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-en-social-media-protection-brand-fraud-report.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2018) (examining the prevalence of fake, branded social media). 
196 UOPX News, Nearly Two-Thirds of U.S. Adults with Social Media Accounts Say They Have 
Been Hacked, U. PHOENIX (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.phoenix.edu/news/releases/2016/04/uopx-social-
media-hacking.html. 
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high-profile hacking incidents.197 Some hackers can even gain access to 
entire populations of users, compiling user credentials and auctioning them 
off to the highest bidder.198 This exact situation has affected every major 
social media site, including Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and LinkedIn.199 
Social media security issues have arisen time and time again. The DHS 
Notice does not specify any procedure for determining the validity of the 
collected and stored social media information.200  
Hackers continue to have a keen interest in accessing social media 
accounts. Modern hackers often utilize a hacking method known as “spear 
phishing.”201 Spear phishing occurs when a bot social media account, posing 
as a real person, sends a malicious link to an unsuspecting social media 
user.202 Hackers can blend their bots in with other legitimate accounts, and 
even assume the identity of a target account’s friends or acquaintances.203  
These attacks have become so prominent and effective that the United 
States government has taken note of the severity of the situation.204 
According to a Time magazine report, “a Russian-led cyberattack tried to 
spear phish 10,000 Twitter accounts belonging to Defense Department 
employees, using personal messages targeted at specific users.”205 Once an 
account is compromised and hackers have acquired personal information and 
passwords, the hacker can assume the stolen identity, or sell the information 
to the highest bidder. The DHS Notice does not provide any protections for 
situations where a social media account is compromised. The DHS Notice 
presumes that all social media activity is legitimate, and would purportedly 
sweep up and permanently store all information connected to a target 
individual.  
There may also be issues with specific social media platforms, as 
applied to the DHS Notice. Again, the Notice specifies that “social media 
handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results” are 
to be collected and stored. 206 Despite this seemingly broad language, each 
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social media platform has unique characteristics. For instance, Twitter 
features a unique ability for a user to “retweet” content that was originally 
posted by a different user.207 Many Twitter users have even gone as far as 
adding a disclaimer to their profile, exclaiming that “RTs [retweets] do not 
equal endorsements.”208 Will retweeted information be added to an A-File? 
Will a tweet that is “liked” or “favorited” by the user negatively impact 
someone looking to travel to the United States? Unsurprisingly, the DHS 
Notice does not answer any of these questions.  
The DHS Notice does not consider many unique issues associated with 
social media. Thus, this new DHS policy could unfairly affect people who 
are not as technologically savvy as others. The policy, as understood by the 
language in the Notice, is simply not particularized enough. Therefore, the 
DHS should halt this policy, and consider the problems associated with 
modern social media usage.  
E. Relevant User-Submitted Comments 
As is customary with all notices posted in the Federal Register, 
interested individuals have the ability to submit comments on the proposed 
new policy. The Notice comment period began on September 18, 2017 and 
ended on October 18, 2017.209 During this time, almost 3,000 comments were 
submitted. Most of these submitted comments present compelling arguments 
against the implementation of the DHS data collection policy. Several of 
these comments will be highlighted herein.  
Andrew Sellars, the director of the Boston University/Massachusetts 
Institute Technology (“MIT”) and Cyberlaw Clinic, submitted a comment on 
behalf of students and faculty at MIT.210 Sellars summarizes the comment by 
stating that: 
The Commenters are all students and scholars of Internet 
communications and related technologies, and write 
specifically to inform DHS of the critical shortsightedness of 
this planned expansion, to explain why a sound academic 
would never propose such a system of information 
collection, and to emphasize why such collection inherently 
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violates the Fair Information Practice Principles that this 
agency has adopted.211 
First, Sellars argues that the Notice is not clear enough, making it 
impossible to determine what kind of information would be collected and 
stored.212 Sellars also points out that the only person who is unable to access 
the A-Files database is the subject themselves.213 Sellars contends that this is 
incompatible with the Privacy Act of 1974.214  
Sellars’s second main argument is that a broad collection scheme is too 
unprincipled to actually catch any dangerous content.215 Sellars explains that 
the “[t]he ease of development of social media means that there is a plethora 
of fake and misleading accounts online, which can easily portray an 
individual as something they are not.”216 Sellars explains that he is worried 
that “[s]uch a system will . . . experience a sea of false negatives and false 
positives.”217 Many of Sellars’s positions support the arguments proffered 
herein.  
Another compelling comment was submitted by Catherine Martinez and 
111 other members of the Yale Law School community.218 This comment is 
critical of the proposed DHS rule, “urg[ing] DHS to rescind the rule.”219 The 
comment first argues that the proposed DHS rule violates the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.220 The commenters argue that 
because the policy indirectly limits access and use of internet speech, the First 
Amendment is violated.221 “[T]he Proposed Rule threatens to chill 
individuals’ ability to exercise their rights to freedom of speech and 
association on social media.”222 
Later in their impressive comment, the Yale commenters argue that the 
proposed DHS policy violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.223 They 
argue that because the proposed policy is to collect the social media 
information of naturalized citizens, it is impermissibly classifying citizens 
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“on the basis of national origin.”224 “By allowing the DHS to collect this 
information about naturalized citizens while excluding natural-born citizens, 
this policy conditions its application to citizens on the basis of national origin, 
and therefore is inherently suspect.”225 They then argue that this 
discrimination is not supported by the necessary compelling governmental 
interest, and that the policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.226 
Thus, according to these Yale commenters, the policy violates the Equal 
Protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.227  
The above comments are just a few of the unique and convincing 
arguments presented by concerned individuals. The clear majority of the 
comments submitted express extreme distrust and condemnation towards the 
DHS policy outline in the Notice. Many of these complex, creative, and 
compelling comments have attacked the policy in every way imaginable. The 
DHS policy is clearly problematic, prompting an enormous public outcry. 
The resistance against the DHS policy is clear, and the DHS should halt the 
now-implemented policy until these concerns are addressed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The DHS Notice is an example of the powerful internet data oversight 
powers the United States government has reserved for itself. The internet has 
evolved to such a point that outdated legislation does not adequately protect 
the American people from constant surveillance. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is also being used to assist the government in its spying 
operations.228 The United States government is in no hurry to provide its 
people with more adequate protections—especially at a time when 
hypervigilant safety-based paternalism is at its peak. Instead, the government 
is targeting vulnerable immigrant populations, ramping up its data-collection 
operations while carefully broadcasting the policy to the world. Under 
existing domestic law, this collection is perfectly legal. 
We are now at a crossroad. The current legal situation—surrounding the 
governmental collection of internet-based information—is remarkably lax. 
Even though the DHS policy is proposed to track immigrant internet data, 
citizen data does not feature any increased protections. Most people have 
never heard of the third-party doctrine, and are simply unaware that their 
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online activity is ripe for governmental surveillance. To rectify this legal 
inadequacy, increased data protections must be created and implemented by 
the American legislature or judiciary. Nevertheless, for reasons mentioned 
herein, the United States government should discontinue the collection and 
storage of immigrant social media information. 
